Alesina and Giuliano (J. Econ. Growth, 15(2), 2010) illustrate that strong family ties lead to lower geographical mobility and reduced labor force participation of young and female individuals. We extend their analysis by arguing that the effect of strong family ties on economic outcomes depends on a country's level of economic and institutional development. This cross-country heterogeneity arises because strong family ties not only foster traditional family values (which have disruptive effects on economic outcomes), but also provide economically valuable social networks -especially in societies characterized by weak institutions and limited market access. Empirical evidence using the European and World Value Surveys (EVS/WVS) is supportive of our theoretical argument. 
Introduction
show that strong family ties are causally related to several factors disruptive to economic growth, including lower labor force participation of young and female individuals and lower geographical mobility (see also Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Alesina, Algan, Cahuc & Giuliano, 2015) . Subsequent studies illustrate similar negative effects of strong family ties on the labor force participation of elderly individuals, on individuals' interpersonal trust (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011 , 2013 and on overall economic dynamism (Duranton & Rodriguez-Pose, 2009 ).
In this article, we maintain that allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties (for similar claims in different settings, see Gërxhani, 2004; Cervellati, Jung, Sunde, & Vischer, 2014) . The underlying argument starts from the observation that existing studies' theoretical reasoning mostly refers to the connection between strong family ties and (traditional) family values. For instance, female labor force participation (LFP) is argued to decline with strong family ties because it is associated with a more traditional view of a woman's role in society (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010) . However, in our view, family ties can also play a key role in the establishment of economically valuable networks (Wahba & Zenou, 2005) via, for instance, marriages (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Luke, Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2004; Wang, 2011) . Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) , for instance, show that marital arrangements, which establish a new network with the family of the spouse, mitigate farmers' income volatility in rural India. Luke et al. (2004) similarly find that family networks, again organized around marriages, increase individuals' performance in urban labor markets in both Kenya and India. Wang (2011) uses the exogenous shock of the death of the father-in-law to show the causal effect of family networks on earnings; the loss of the father-in-law is found to induce a 7% decrease in a man's earnings. Hence, familybased networks reflect a capacity to extend one's connections, and might thereby allow 2 access to economically valuable opportunities (Montgomery, 1991 , Munshi, 2003 , Wahba & Zenou, 2005 . 1 Crucially, family networks are likely to matter more for economic outcomes in developing countries. At a risk of generalization, developing countries tend to have weaker formal institutions (Dreher et al., 2014) . As informal institutions -such as the family -become a substitute for formal institutions when the latter are incomplete (Gërxhani, 2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Dreher, Méon & Schneider, 2014) , family networks can play a central role for individuals' social and economic needs in such settings. This implies, however, that any positive effect of family networks on labor market outcomes (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Luke et al., 2004; Wang, 2011) will be particularly forceful in developing countries. Even when there is a general negative impact of traditional family values on LFP (as argued in Alesina & Giuliano, 2010 , 2013 Alesina et al., 2015) , the overall effect of strong family ties thus is likely to still vary across countries depending on their level of economic and institutional development. Specifically, one would expect weaker disruptive effects of strong family ties on economic behavior in less affluent, underdeveloped countries.
A similar argument can also be made for the link between strong family ties and individuals' interpersonal trust. Strong family ties are generally argued to reduce the need for social contacts with people outside the family, because individuals' needs are taken care off within the family (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2013) . This closed network undermines individuals' ability to judge others' trustworthiness (thereby reducing interpersonal trust), and decreases their access to opportunities outside the family (impeding their economic progress).
2 Yet, this line of argument again pays too little attention to the potential role of family networks in developing, low-income countries. In such settings, as mentioned, the network effects induced by strong family ties emphatically increase people's contact possibilities outside the family and buttress the availability of economically valuable 3 opportunities (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Luke et al., 2004; Wang, 2011) . As before, therefore, the effect of strong family ties on social trust is likely to display cross-country heterogeneity depending on countries' levels of economic and institutional development.
Section 2 describes the dataset and estimation strategy employed to test for cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on economic outcomes. The main findings are summarized in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains a concluding discussion.
Data and estimation approach
Following Alesina and Giuliano (2010 , 2011 , 2013 Our measure of the strength of family ties combines information from three separate survey questions (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010 , 2011 , 2013 Alesina et al., 2015) . These are, respectively, related to family's importance to the respondent, his/her evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of parents towards children, and his/her evaluation of children's duties and responsibilities towards their parents. 3 We combine these questions using a principal components analysis (PCA), and employ the first principal component as our main explanatory variable. 4 As shown in detail by Alesina and Giuliano (2013) 
________________
To test for cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties, we run equation (1) family ties is generally persistent across generations and is related to historical family structures (Galasso & Profeta, 2012) . To preserve space, and because we rely on the same dataset as Giuliano (2010, 2013) , our analysis will not repeat these causality tests. Table 2 reports our main findings using OLS. 6 In column 1, we employ the full sample of countries as in Alesina and Giuliano (2010 , 2011 , 2013 . Columns 2 to 5 report results for, respectively, the subsample of low income (column 2), low-middle income (column 3), middle-upper income (column 4) and high income (column 5) countries. To preserve space, and because they are generally equivalent to those reported in Alesina and Giuliano (2010 , 2011 , 2013 , we do not present the coefficients of the control variables.
Results

Baseline results
________________ Table 2 about here ________________ Column 1 shows that the effect of strong family ties on the different dependent variables in the entire sample is similar, both in terms of effect size and statistical significance, to Alesina and Giuliano (2010 , 2011 , 2013 . 7 Specifically, family ties have a negative and substantively meaningful effect on social trust, geographical mobility, female and youth LFP, but do not significantly affect elderly LFP. The remaining columns in Table 2 , however, indicate that this negative relation is mostly driven by developed, high-income countries. Indeed, while all coefficient estimates in column 5 are negative and statistically significant (except for elderly LFP), moving towards less developed, lower income countries leads to substantively and/or statistically weaker effect sizes for female and young LFP. For the measures of geographical 7 mobility and interpersonal trust, the negative effect of strong family ties is even reversed when the level of development is sufficiently low. Except for elderly and female LFP, we can thereby formally reject at conventional levels of statistical significance that the effect of strong family ties is the same across all countries.
These findings should not be interpreted as a rebuttal of Alesina and Giuliano (2010 , 2011 , 2013 . Our results do, however, provide a valuable extension by confirming important crosscountry heterogeneity in the effect of family ties -especially when looking at countries with the lowest levels of economic and institutional development. Note also that these results cannot be explained by potential differences in the level of variation observed in family ties across the four subsamples -and particularly within the low-income countries. Figure 1 above indeed illustrates that significant variation exists within each group of countries, and that there are only marginal differences in the observed standard deviations across groups.
The exception posed by the results on female LFP -where the estimated effect sizes are roughly equivalent across all country groups -is interesting from a theoretical perspective.
This indeed appears to suggest that the positive family networks effect counteracting the negative family values effect in low-income countries (see above) lacks substantive power for female LFP. Such interpretation could be in line with Magruder (2010) , who shows that the labor market advantage of family networks in South Africa arises only for men, not for women. Family networks might thus be less useful for women than for men in low-income countries, which becomes reflected in the relative homogeneity of our findings across countries on this variable. 8 Alternatively, however, it may also be that for female LFP, the negative family values effect strengthens in equal measure to the family networks effect while moving towards less developed countries.
As a preliminary step towards disentangling both explanations, we experimented with 
Robustness check using alternative country classification
In this section, we experiment with different measures of institutional quality to approximate economic and institutional development. Specifically, we consider three indicators included in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These aggregate information from dozens of indicators, and are updated annually since 1996. The measures included here are: i) Government Effectiveness, which assesses the quality of policy formulation and implementation, public services and the civil service as well as the degree of its independence from political pressures; ii) Regulatory Quality, which measures the government's ability to formulate and implement high-quality policies and regulations; iii)
Rule of Law, which evaluates "the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Worldwide Governance Indicators, www.govindicators.org).
The WGI place each country in a percentile rank according to their position in the global ranking. Higher positions thereby reflect better outcomes. To align our presentation to that of previous tables, we use the original scores to divide countries in four distinct groups: i.e. low 9 quality institutions (0-25), low-middle quality institutions (26-50), upper-middle quality institutions (51-75) and high quality institutions (76-100). We then re-estimate equation (1) separately for these four groups of countries. The results concerning Government Effectiveness are provided in Table 3 (Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law provide similar findings, which are available upon request). Note that the sample is restricted here to data collected after 1995 since WGI data are available only since 1996.
________________ Table 3 about here ________________ Despite the shorter period and the alternative operationalization of countries' level of development, the results in Table 3 are a close replication of those in Table 2 . That is, strong family ties have a meaningful negative effect on trust, geographical mobility, female and youth LFP in countries with high-quality formal institutions. However, moving towards less developed countries in the left-hand side of the table generally weakens this negative relation, and in some cases reverses it. This confirms that our results are robust to different classifications of countries' economic and institutional development.
Robustness check on political engagement
Our theoretical argument relies on the substantial potential economic value of family networks in less-developed countries. We can assess this theoretical mechanism by evaluating whether the link between family ties and non-economic outcomes (such as political interest and political engagement) differs depending on countries' level of economic and institutional development. As the economic value of family networks should have no effect on non-economic outcomes, we would not expect to observe cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on non-economic outcomes. This test is inspired by Alesina and Giuliano (2011) , who show that the detrimental effects of strong family ties extend to political interest and political engagement. The underlying argument relies on Banfield's (1958) theory of "amoral familism", which holds that strong family ties might act as a substitute for interest in public affairs. All attention under such 'amoral familism' is directed inwards -i.e. towards the needs and aspirations of one's immediate family circleand leads to a disregard for external, non-family issues (for more details, see Alesina & Giuliano, 2011) .
In Table 4 , we report the results from re-estimating model (1) 'have done'). Alesina and Giuliano (2011) . Importantly, this observation holds both for the entire set of countries (column 1), as well as the four subsets based on World Bank development categories (columns 2 to 5). Overall, this provides further substantiation of our results in tables 2 and 3, since a heterogeneous effect of family ties appears only on the (economic)
variables targeted by our theoretical line of argument. 
Conclusion
Recent work has shown that strong family ties have a detrimental effect on several sources of economic growth including interpersonal trust, geographical mobility and young, female and elderly LFP (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010 , 2011 , 2013 Alesina et al., 2015) . In this article,
we have argued that allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity in this effect of family ties. The underlying idea is that in developing countries, where institutions and markets are weaker (Gërxhani, 2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Dreher et al., 2014) , strong family ties will act as a substitute for the market and can have important -and economically valuable -network effects that counteract the negative effect of (traditional) family values.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence in line with this idea. Strong family ties only have a substantive, statistically significant negative effect on labor force participation, trust and geographical mobility in developed high-income countries. This negative relation disappears -and can even reverse -at lower levels of development, where family networks become more economically valuable as a substitute for market access. These results are robust to different measures of economic development. Moreover, a robustness check on noneconomic outcomes corroborates that the observed heterogeneity may indeed derive from the economic value of family networks in under-developed countries.
These results not only highlight the importance of accounting for the various, and sometimes contrasting, effects of strong family ties on economic behavior, but also raise a number of important avenues for future research. For instance, they emphasize the need for a deeper understanding of the exact relations and tradeoffs between formal and informal institutions (such as the family). While the family unit has rightly been recognized as central to economic behavior, our knowledge of how the role of family ties interacts with the effects of formal institutions remains overly limited. A recent exception to this general trend is Durante, Labartino and Perotti (2015) , who show that a 1998 legislative reform in Italy weakening the institutional constraints on the academic hiring process caused a significant increase in the prevalence and persistence of family-based hiring practices only in areas characterized by low civic capital. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2015) argue that the deregulation of formal labor market institutions "requires geographical mobility", which in turn "requires relatively weak family ties". Still, as we have shown, the negative link between strong family ties and geographical mobility holds only in a subset of affluent countries, such that the apparent general nature of their conclusion would require a more in-depth assessment in future research.
Clearly, a better understanding of such interactions between formal and informal institutions is of critical importance to a more accurate design of public policies. In fact, since similar self-reported attitudes towards family ties lead to opposite outcomes depending on the socio-economic characteristics of the country, it is important for public policy-makers aiming at, for instance, labor market regulation, redistributive policies, education and welfare provision to properly account for the exact influence of family ties in their setting 10 .
important at all) to 4 (very important). The second question measures respondents' agreement with one of two statements: (1) "One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it"; (2) "Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them". The third and final question again measures respondents' agreement with one of two statements: (1) "Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children"; (2) "It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being".
effects provide similar results. For ease of interpretation, Figure A .1 visualizes the marginal effect of family ties across the different country groups in these interaction models, which are estimated using multilevel models -where individuals (level 1) are nested within countries (level 2) and the family ties variable is interacted with the World Bank classification index (details available upon request). Note: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. 'Interest in politics' is measured as: "How interested would you say you are in politics? (from (1) not at all interested to (4) very interested). The remaining dependent variables derive from the following question: "I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things (3), whether you might do it (2) or would never under any circumstances do it (1): Signing a petition; Joining in boycotts; Attending lawful demonstrations; Joining unofficial strikes; Occupying buildings or factories." Countries are divided into four groups based on the World Bank development classification. Control variables in this model include gender, age, age squared, marital status, education level, survey fixed effects, country fixed effects and interactions between country and survey fixed effects. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
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Figure 1 -Family Ties Means and Standard Deviations
Note: The x axis shows the four groups of countries distinguished by the World Bank development classification. The y axis presents average levels and standard deviations of the family ties' variable (higher values correspond to stronger family ties).
